Security Extension Specification

X Consortium Standard

David P. Wiggins

   X Consortium

   X Version 11, Release 7.7

   Version 7.1

   Copyright © 1996 X Consortium

   Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person
   obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation
   files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without
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   conditions:

   The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
   included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.

   THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
   EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES
   OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
   NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE X CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE
   FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
   OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
   CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN
   THE SOFTWARE.

   Except as contained in this notice, the name of the X
   Consortium shall not be used in advertising or otherwise to
   promote the sale, use or other dealings in this Software
   without prior written authorization from the X Consortium.

   X Window System is a trademark of The OpenGroup.

   November 15, 1996
     __________________________________________________________

   Table of Contents

   1. Introduction
   2. Requests

        SecurityQueryVersion
        SecurityGenerateAuthorization
        SecurityRevokeAuthorization

   3. Changes to Core Requests

        Resource ID Usage
        Extension Security
        Keyboard Security
        Image Security
        Property Security
        Miscellaneous Security

   4. New Authorization Method
   5. Encoding

        Types
        Request Encoding
        Event Encoding
        Authorization Method Encoding

   6. C Language Binding

Chapter 1. Introduction

   The Security extension contains new protocol needed to provide
   enhanced X server security. The Security extension should not
   be exposed to untrusted clients (defined below).

Chapter 2. Requests

   Table of Contents

   SecurityQueryVersion
   SecurityGenerateAuthorization
   SecurityRevokeAuthorization

SecurityQueryVersion

   This request returns the major and minor version numbers of
   this extension.

   SecurityQueryVersion

   client-major-version

   CARD16

   client-minor-version

   CARD16

   =>

   server-major-version

   CARD16

   server-minor-version

   CARD16

   The client-major-version and client-minor-version numbers
   indicate what version of the protocol the client wants the
   server to implement. The server-major-version and the
   server-minor-version numbers returned indicate the protocol
   this extension actually supports. This might not equal the
   version sent by the client. An implementation can (but need
   not) support more than one version simultaneously. The
   server-major-version and server-minor-version allow the
   creation of future revisions of the Security protocol that may
   be necessary. In general, the major version would increment for
   incompatible changes, and the minor version would increment for
   small, upward-compatible changes. Servers that support the
   protocol defined in this document will return a
   server-major-version of one (1), and a server-minor-version of
   zero (0).

   Clients using the Security extension must issue a
   SecurityQueryVersion request before any other Security request
   in order to negotiate a compatible protocol version; otherwise,
   the client will get undefined behavior (Security may or may not
   work).

SecurityGenerateAuthorization

   This request causes the server to create and return a new
   authorization with specific characteristics. Clients can
   subsequently connect using the new authorization and will
   inherit some of the characteristics of the authorization.

   SecurityGenerateAuthorization

   authorization-protocol-name

   STRING8

   authorization-protocol-data

   STRING8

   value-mask

   BITMASK

   value-list

   LISTofVALUE

   =>

   authorization-id

   AUTHID

   authorization-data-return

   STRING8

   Errors: AuthorizationProtocol, Value, Alloc

   authorization-protocol-name is the name of the authorization
   method for which the server should generate a new authorization
   that subsequent clients can use to connect to the server. If
   the authorization-protocol-name is not one that the server
   supports, or if authorization-protocol-data does not make sense
   for the given authorization-protocol-name, an
   AuthorizationProtocol error results.

   authorization-protocol-data is authorization-method specific
   data that can be used in some way to generate the
   authorization.

Note

   In this version of the extension, the only authorization method
   required to be supported is "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1" with any
   amount of authorization-protocol-data (including none). The
   server may use the authorization-protocol-data as an additional
   source of randomness used to generate the authorization. Other
   authorization methods can supply their own interpretation of
   authorization-protocol-data.

   The value-mask and value-list specify attributes of the
   authorization that are to be explicitly initialized. The
   possible values are:
   Attribute Type                    Default

   timeout

   CARD32

   60

   group

   XID or None

   None

   trust-level

   {SecurityClientTrusted,

             SecurityClientUntrusted}

   SecurityClientUntrusted

   event-mask

   SecurityAuthorizationRevoked,

             or None

   None

   timeout is the timeout period in seconds for this
   authorization. A timeout value of zero means this authorization
   will never expire. For non-zero timeout values, when timeout
   seconds have elapsed since the last time that the authorization
   entered the state of having no connections authorized by it,
   and if no new connections used the authorization during that
   time, the authorization is automatically purged. (Note that
   when an authorization is created, it enters the state of having
   no connections authorized by it.) Subsequent connection
   attempts using that authorization will fail. This is to
   facilitate "fire and forget" launching of applications.

   group is an application group ID as defined by the Application
   Group extension, or None. Any other values will cause a Value
   error. When a group is destroyed, all authorizations specifying
   that group are revoked as described under the
   SecurityRevokeAuthorization request. The Application Group
   extension attaches additional semantics to the group.

   trust-level tells whether clients using the authorization are
   trusted or untrusted. If trust-level is not one of the
   constants SecurityClientTrusted or SecurityClientUntrusted, a
   Value error results.

   event-mask defines which events the client is interested in for
   this authorization. When the authorization expires or is
   revoked if event-mask contains SecurityAuthorizationRevoked a
   SecurityAuthorizationRevoked event is reported to the client.

   The SecurityAuthorizationRevoked event contains the following
   field:
   Field Type

   authorization-id

   AUTHID

   where authorization-id is the identification of the
   authorization that was revoked.

   If an invalid value-mask is specified, a Value error occurs.

   The returned authorization-id is a non-zero value that uniquely
   identifies this authorization for use in other requests. The
   value space for type AUTHID is not required to be disjoint from
   values spaces of other core X types, e.g. resource ids, atoms,
   visual ids, and keysyms. Thus, a given numeric value might be
   both a valid AUTHID and a valid atom, for example.

   authorization-data-return is the data that a client should use
   in some authorization-method-specific way to make a connection
   with this authorization. For "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1,"
   authorization-data-return should be sent as the
   authorization-protocol-data in the connection setup message. It
   is not required that other authorization methods use
   authorization-data-return this way.

SecurityRevokeAuthorization

   This request deletes an authorization created by
   SecurityGenerateAuthorization.

   SecurityRevokeAuthorization

   authorization-id

   AUTHID

   Errors: Authorization

   If authorization-id does not name a valid authorization, an
   Authorization error occurs. Otherwise, this request kills all
   clients currently connected using the authorization specified
   by authorization-id. The authorization is deleted from the
   server's database, so future attempts by clients to connect
   with this authorization will fail.

Chapter 3. Changes to Core Requests

   Table of Contents

   Resource ID Usage
   Extension Security
   Keyboard Security
   Image Security
   Property Security
   Miscellaneous Security

   A server supporting this extension modifies the handling of
   some core requests in the following ways.

Resource ID Usage

   If an untrusted client makes a request that specifies a
   resource ID that is not owned by another untrusted client, a
   protocol error is sent to the requesting client indicating that
   the specified resource does not exist. The following exceptions
   apply. An untrusted client can:
    1. use the QueryTree, GetGeometry, and TranslateCoordinates
       requests without restriction.
    2. use colormap IDs that are returned in the default-colormap
       field of its connection setup information in any colormap
       requests.
    3. specify a root window as:
         a. the drawable field of CreatePixmap, CreateGC, and
            QueryBestSize.
         b. the parent field of CreateWindow.
         c. the window field of CreateColormap, ListProperties,
            and GetWindowAttributes.
         d. the grab-window or confine-to fields of GrabPointer.
         e. the grab-window field of UngrabButton.
         f. the destination of SendEvent, but only if all of the
            following are true. (These conditions cover all the
            events that the ICCCM specifies with a root window
            destination.)
              i. The propogate field of SendEvent is False.
             ii. The event-mask field of SendEvent is
                 ColormapChange, StructureNotify, or the logical
                 OR of SubstructureRedirect with
                 SubstructureNotify.
             iii. The event type being sent is UnmapNotify,
                 ConfigureRequest, or ClientMessage.
         g. the window field of ChangeWindowAttributes, but only
            if the value-mask contains only event-mask and the
            corresponding value is StructureNotify,
            PropertyChange, or the logical OR of both.

Note

   ISSUE: are root window exceptions needed for these?
   WarpPointer, ReparentWindow (parent), CirculateWindow,
   QueryPointer (emacs does this), GetMotionEvents.

Extension Security

   This extension introduces the notion of secure and insecure
   extensions. A secure extension is believed to be safe to use by
   untrusted clients; that is, there are no significant security
   concerns known that an untrusted client could use to destroy,
   modify, or steal data of trusted clients. This belief may be
   founded on a careful analysis of the extension protocol, its
   implementation, and measures taken to "harden" the extension to
   close security weaknesses. All extensions not considered secure
   are called insecure. The implementation details of how an
   extension is identified as secure or insecure are beyond the
   scope of this specification.

   ListExtensions will only return names of secure extensions to
   untrusted clients.

   If an untrusted client uses QueryExtension on an insecure
   extension that the server supports, the reply will have the
   present field set to False and the major-opcode field set to
   zero to indicate that the extension is not supported.

   If an untrusted client successfully guesses the major opcode of
   an insecure extension, attempts by it to execute requests with
   that major opcode will fail with a Request error.

Keyboard Security

   The protocol interpretation changes in this section are
   intended to prevent untrusted applications from stealing
   keyboard input that was meant for trusted clients and to
   prevent them from interfering with the use of the keyboard.

   The behavior of some keyboard-related requests and events is
   modified when the client is untrusted depending on certain
   server state at the time of request execution or event
   generation. Specifically, if a hypothetical keyboard event were
   generated given the current input focus, pointer position,
   keyboard grab state, and window event selections, and if that
   keyboard event would not be delivered to any untrusted client,
   the following changes apply:
    1. The bit vector representing the up/down state of the keys
       returned by QueryKeymap and KeymapNotify is all zeroes.
    2. GrabKeyboard returns a status of AlreadyGrabbed.
    3. SetInputFocus does nothing. Note that this means the
       Globally Active Input and WM_TAKE_FOCUS mechanisms
       specified in the ICCCM will not work with untrusted
       clients.
    4. Passive grabs established by GrabKey that would otherwise
       have activated do not activate.

   If an untrusted client attempts to use any of the following
   requests, the only effect is that the client receives an Access
   error: SetModifierMapping, ChangeKeyboardMapping,
   ChangeKeyboardControl.

   If an InputOnly window owned by an untrusted client has a
   parent owned by a trusted client, all attempts to map the
   window will be ignored. This includes mapping attempts
   resulting from MapWindow, MapSubwindows, ReparentWindow, and
   save-set processing.

   However, if the parent of an InputOnly window owned by an
   untrusted client is the root window, attempts to map that
   window will be performed as expected. This is in line with the
   root window exceptions above.

Image Security

   It should be impossible for an untrusted client to retrieve the
   image contents of a trusted window unless a trusted client
   takes action to allow this. We introduce the following defenses
   in support of this requirement.

   The restrictions on resource ID usage listed above prevent
   untrusted clients from using GetImage directly on windows not
   belonging to trusted clients.

   If an untrusted client tries to set the background-pixmap
   attribute of an untrusted window to None, the server will
   instead use a server-dependent background which must be
   different than None.

   The X protocol description of GetImage states that the returned
   contents of regions of a window obscured by noninferior windows
   are undefined if the window has no backing store. Some
   implementations return the contents of the obscuring windows in
   these regions. When an untrusted client uses GetImage, this
   behavior is forbidden; the server must fill the obscured
   regions in the returned image with a server-dependent pattern.

   If an untrusted window has trusted inferiors, their contents
   are vulnerable to theft via GetImage on the untrusted parent,
   as well as being vulnerable to destruction via drawing with
   subwindow-mode IncludeInferiors on the untrusted parent. An
   untrusted window having trusted inferiors can only occur at the
   request of a trusted client. It is expected to be an unusual
   configuration.

Property Security

   Unlike the other security provisions described in this
   document, security for property access is not amenable to a
   fixed policy because properties are used for inter-client
   communication in diverse ways and may contain data of varying
   degrees of sensitivity. Therefore, we only list the possible
   restrictions the server may decide to impose on use of
   properties on trusted windows by untrusted clients. How the
   server chooses which restrictions from this list to apply to a
   particular property access is implementation dependent ^[1].

   The X Protocol property requests are ChangeProperty,
   GetProperty, DeleteProperty, RotateProperties, and
   ListProperties. For these requests, the server can allow the
   request to execute normally (as if it had been issued by a
   trusted client), ignore the request completely (as if it were a
   NoOperation), or ignore the request except to send an Atom
   error to the client. Ignoring a ListProperties request means
   replying that the window has no properties. ListProperties may
   also reply with a subset of the existing properties if the
   server is doing property hiding; see below. An ignored
   GetProperty request may reply that the property does not exist,
   or that it exists but contains no data.

   The server may decide to hide certain properties on certain
   windows from untrusted clients ^[2]. If a property is to be
   hidden, it must be done consistently to avoid confusing
   clients. This means that for untrusted clients:
     * That property should not be returned by ListProperties.
     * PropertyNotify events should not be sent for that property.
     * GetProperty on that property should reply that the property
       does not exist (the return type is None, the format and
       bytes-after are zero, and the value is empty).

   For a property that the server is protecting but not hiding,
   consistency must also be maintained:
     * That property should be returned by ListProperties.
     * PropertyNotify events should be sent for that property.
     * GetProperty on that property should reply that the property
       exists (if it really does) but the value is empty (return
       type and format are their real values, and the "length of
       value" field in the reply is zero).

Miscellaneous Security

   If an untrusted client attempts to use ChangeHosts, ListHosts,
   or SetAccessControl, the only effect is that the client
   receives an Access error.

   If an untrusted client attempts to use ConvertSelection on a
   selection with a trusted selection owner window, the server
   generates a SelectionNotify event to the requestor with
   property None.
   __________________________________________________________

   ^[1] In the X Consortium server implementation, property access
   is controlled by a configuration file; see the -sp option in
   the Xserver(1) manual page.

   ^[2] The X Consortium server implementation does not currently
   provide a way to hide properties.

Chapter 4. New Authorization Method

   This extension includes a new authorization method named
   "XC-QUERY-SECURITY-1". Its purpose is to allow an external
   agent such as the X firewall proxy to probe an X server to
   determine whether that server meets certain security criteria
   without requiring the agent to have its own authorization for
   that server. The agent may use the returned information to make
   a decision. For example, the X firewall proxy may choose not to
   forward client connections to servers that do not meet the
   criteria.

   To use this authorization method, the client (or proxy) sends
   "XC-QUERY-SECURITY-1" as the authorization-protocol-name in the
   initial connection setup message. The
   authorization-protocol-data may be empty or may contain
   additional security criteria desribed below. If the success
   field of the server's reply is Authenticate, the server
   supports the security extension, and the server meets all
   specified additional security criteria. In this case, the
   client should resend the initial connection setup message
   substituting the authorization protocol name and data that
   should be used to authorize the connection. If the success
   field of the server's reply is anything other than
   Authenticate, either the server does not support the security
   extension, does not meet (or cannot determine if it meets) all
   of the additional security criteria, or chooses for internal
   reasons not to answer with Authenticate. In this case, the
   client should close the connection.

   If the authorization-protocol-data sent with
   "XC-QUERY-SECURITY-1" is not empty, it specifies additional
   security criteria for the server to check, as follows.

   authorization-protocol-data

   policy-mask

   BITMASK

   policies

   LISTofSECURITYPOLICY

   The policy-mask field is any logical-OR combination of the
   constants Extensions and SitePolicies. For each bit set in
   policy-mask, there is a SECURITYPOLICY element in policies. The
   nth element in policies corresponds to the nth 1-bit in
   policy-mask, counting upward from bit 0.

   SECURITYPOLICY

   policy-type

   {Disallow, Permit}

   names

   LISTofSTR

   For a SECURITYPOLICY corresponding to policy-mask Extensions,
   if policy-type is Disallow the server is required to consider
   as insecure all extensions given in names. No policy is
   specified for extensions not listed in names. If policy-type is
   Permit the server may consider only those extensions given in
   names to be secure; all other extensions must be treated as
   insecure. If these constraints are not met, the server should
   not return Authenticate in the success field of the reply.
   Servers can but need not dynamically configure themselves in
   response to an Extensions SECURITYPOLICY; a conforming server
   might simply compare the policy with a compiled-in table of
   extensions and their security status.

   For a SECURITYPOLICY corresponding to policy-mask SitePolicies,
   policy-type Disallow means the server must not have been
   configured with any of the site policies given in names.
   Policy-type Permit means the server must have been configured
   with at least one of the site policies given in names. If these
   constraints are not met, the server should not return
   Authenticate in the success field of the reply.

   SitePolicies provide a way to express new forms of
   security-relevant information that could not be anticipated at
   the time of this writing. For example, suppose the server is
   found to have a critical security defect. When a fix is
   developed, a site policy string could be associated with the
   fix. Servers with the fix would advertise that site policy, and
   the X firewall proxy would specify that site policy in a
   SECURITYPOLICY with policy-type Permit.

Chapter 5. Encoding

   Table of Contents

   Types
   Request Encoding
   Event Encoding
   Authorization Method Encoding

   Please refer to the X11 Protocol Encoding document as this
   section uses syntactic conventions and data types established
   there.

   The name of this extension is "SECURITY".

Types

   AUTHID: CARD32

Request Encoding

   SecurityQueryVersion

   1         CARD8         major-opcode
   1         0                minor-opcode
   2         2              request length
   2         CARD16        client-major-version
   2         CARD16        client-minor-version
   =>
   1         1     Reply
   1               unused
   2         CARD16    sequence number
   4         0     reply length
   2         CARD16    server-major-version
   2         CARD16    server-minor-version
   20                            unused

   SecurityRevokeAuthorization

   1         CARD8          major-opcode
   1         2                  minor-opcode
   2         2                  request length
   4         AUTHID         authorization-id

   SecurityGenerateAuthorization

   1         CARD8              major-opcode
   1         1                      minor-opcode
   2         3 + (m+n+3)/4 + s  request length
   2         CARD16             m, number of bytes in authorizatio
   n protocol name
   2         CARD16             n, number of bytes in authorizatio
   n data
   m        STRING8             authorization protocol name
   n         STRING8            authorization protocol data
   p                                  unused, p=pad(m+n)
   4         BITMASK          value-mask (has s bits set to 1)
          #x00000001          timeout
          #x00000002          trust-level
          #x00000004          group
          #x00000008          event-mask
   4s        LISTofVALUE       value-list

   VALUES

   4      CARD32        timeout
   4                          trust-level
          0                   SecurityClientTrusted
          1                   SecurityClientUntrusted
   4      XID              group
   0                          None
   4      CARD32           event-mask
          #x00000001       SecurityAuthorizationRevoked
   =>
   1         1               Reply
   1                         unused
   2         CARD16     sequence number
   4         (q+3)/4        reply length
   4         AUTHID       authorization-id
   2         CARD16       data-length
   18                        unused
   q         STRING8      authorization-data-return
   r                         unused, r=pad(q)

Event Encoding

   SecurityAuthorizationRevoked

   1         0+extension event base        code
   1                                                 unused
   2         CARD16                             sequence number
   4         AUTHID                             authorization id
   24                                                unused

Authorization Method Encoding

   For authorization-protocol-name "XC-QUERY-SECURITY-1", the
   authorization-protocol-data is interpreted as follows:

   authorization-protocol-data

   1         BITMASK                              policy-mask
             #x00000001            Extensions
             #x00000002            SitePolicies
   m        LISTofSECURITYPOLICY                  policies

   SECURITYPOLICY

   1                                                             p
   olicy-type
             0                         Permit
             1                         Disallow
   1         CARD8                                          number
    of STRs in names
   n         LISTofSTR                                      names

   LISTofSTR has the same encoding as in the X protocol: each STR
   is a single byte length, followed by that many characters, and
   there is no padding or termination between STRs.

Chapter 6. C Language Binding

   The header for this extension is <X11/extensions/security.h>.
   All identifier names provided by this header begin with
   XSecurity.

   All functions that have return type Status will return nonzero
   for success and zero for failure.

   Status fsfuncXSecurityQueryExtension(Display *dpy, int
   *major_version_return, int *minor_version_return);

   XSecurityQueryExtension sets major_version_return and
   minor_version_return to the major and minor Security protocol
   version supported by the server. If the Security library is
   compatible with the version returned by the server, it returns
   nonzero. If dpy does not support the Security extension, or if
   there was an error during communication with the server, or if
   the server and library protocol versions are incompatible, it
   returns zero. No other XSecurity functions may be called before
   this function. If a client violates this rule, the effects of
   all subsequent XSecurity calls that it makes are undefined.

   Xauth *fsfuncXSecurityAllocXauth(void);

   In order to provide for future evolution, Xauth structures are
   used to pass and return authorization data, and the library
   provides ways to allocate and deallocate them.

   XSecurityAllocXauth must be used to allocate the Xauth
   structure that is passed to XSecurityGenerateAuthorization.

   For the purposes of the Security extension, the Xauth structure
   has the following fields:
   Type Field name Description

   unsigned short

   name_length

   number of bytes in name

   char *

   name

   authorization protocol name

   unsigned short

   data_length

   number of bytes in data

   char *

   data

   authorization protocol data

   The Xauth structure returned by this function is initialized as
   follows: name_length and data_length are zero, and name and
   data are NULL.

   void fsfuncXSecurityFreeXauth(Xauth *auth);

   XSecurityFreeXauth must be used to free Xauth structures
   allocated by XSecurityAllocXauth or returned by
   XSecurityGenerateAuthorization. It is the caller's
   responsibility to fill in the name and data fields of Xauth
   structures allocated with XSecurityAllocXauth, so this function
   will not attempt to free them. In contrast, all storage
   associated with Xauth structures returned from
   XSecurityGenerateAuthorization will be freed by this function,
   including the name and data fields.

   Bool fsfuncXSecurityRevokeAuthorization(Display *dpy,
   XSecurityAuthorization auth_id);

   XSecurityRevokeAuthorization deletes the authorization
   specified by auth_id, which must be a value returned in the
   auth_id_return parameter of XSecurityGenerateAuthorization. All
   clients that connected with that authorization are be killed.
   Subsequently, clients that attempt to connect using that
   authorization will be refused.

   Xauth *fsfuncXSecurityGenerateAuthorization(Display *dpy, Xauth
   *auth_in, unsigned long valuemask,
   XSecurityAutorizationAttributes *attributes,
   XSecurityAutorization *auth_id_return);

   XSecurityGenerateAuthorization creates a new authorization with
   the specified attributes. The auth_in argument must be
   allocated by XSecurityAllocXauth. The name and name_length
   fields of auth_in should be initialized to the authorization
   protocol name and its length in characters respectively. If
   there is authorization data, the data and data_length fields of
   auth_in should be initialized to the data and its length in
   characters respectivley. The library does not assume that name
   and data are null-terminated strings. The auth_in argument must
   be freed with XSecurityFreeXauth.

   The XSecurityAuthorizationAttributes structure has the
   following fields:
   Type Field name Mask

   unsigned int

   trust_level

   XSecurityTrustLevel

   unsigned int

   timeout

   XSecurityTimeout

   XID

   group

   XSecurityGroup

   long

   event_mask

   XSecurityEventMask

   These correspond to the trust-level, timeout, group, and
   event-mask described in the SecurityGenerateAuthorization
   protocol request. The caller can fill in values for any subset
   of these attributes. The valuemask argument must be the bitwise
   OR of the symbols listed in the Mask column for all supplied
   attributes. The event_mask attribute can be None,
   XSecurityAuthorizationRevokedMask, or XSecurityAllEventMasks.
   In this revision of the protocol specification
   XSecurityAllEventMasks is equivalent to
   XSecurityAuthorizationRevokedMask. If the caller does not need
   to specify any attributes, the attributes argument can be NULL,
   and the valuemask argument must be zero.

   If the function fails, NULL is returned and auth_id_return is
   filled in with zero. Otherwise, a pointer to an Xauth structure
   is returned. The name and name_length fields of the returned
   Xauth structure will be copies of the name that was passed in,
   and the data and data_length fields will be set to the
   authorization data returned by the server. The caller should
   not assume that name and data are null-terminated strings. If
   no authorization data was returned by the server, the data and
   data_length fields will be set to NULL and zero repectively.
   The returned Xauth structure must be freed with
   XSecurityFreeXauth; the caller should not use any other means
   free the structure or any of its components. The auth_id_return
   argument will be filled in with the non-zero authorization id
   of the created authorization.

   The XSecurityAuthorizationRevokedEvent structure has the
   following fields:
   Type Field name Description

   int

   type

   event base + XSecurityAuthorizationRevoked

   unsigned long

   serial

   # of last request processed by server

   Bool

   send_event

   true if this came from SendEvent

   Display*

   display

   Display the event was read from

   XSecurityAuthorization

   auth_id

   revoked authorization id
